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Introduction
Concern now focuses on the threat to humankind posed by nuclear
weapons to an extent not seen since the days of the Ban-the-Bomb
movement of the 1950s.1 During the past several years, millions of peo-
ple have taken to the streets in North America and Europe to express
this concern.2 Now, in the United States, physicians, scientists and law-
yers are banding together in their own professional organizations to
concentrate energies and expertise on this, the greatest problem of our
age.3
As part of the legal community's effort to address issues presented
by nuclear weapons,4 Professor Arthur S. Miller has written a thought-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Nova University Center for the Study of Law. The
author is a member of the Consultative Council of the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear
Policy. He gratefully acknowledges the assistance provided by Maria Fernandez-Valle,
a Goodwin Research Fellow at Nova Law Center, during preparation of this Article for
publication.
1. "Concern for the risks of nuclear proliferation (and for the underlying risk of
nuclear war) is the beginning of wisdom." Farley, Nuclear Proliferation, in SETrING
NATIONAL PRIORITIES: THE NEXT TEN YEARS 129, 165 (H. Owen & C. L. Schultze
eds. 1976).
During November 1982 elections, Nuclear Freeze proposals were approved in 9
out of 10 state referenda and 27 out of 29 city and county referenda. Union of Con-
cerned Scientists, November llth Convocation Update, No. 8 (Nov. 5, 1982).
2. See generally Butterfield, Anatomy of the Nuclear Protest, N.Y. Times, July
11, 1982, § 6 (Magazine), at 14.
3. E.g., Physicians for Social Responsibility, the Union of Concerned Scientists,
the Lawyers' Alliance for Nuclear Arms Control, and the New York-based Lawyers'
Committee on Nuclear Policy.
4. During the 1982-83 academic year symposia or law review issues dedicated to
examination of legal questions 'raised by nuclear weaponry have been or will be pro-
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ful and thought-provoking essay exploring, in a preliminary way, con-
stitutional considerations relevant to American nuclear weapons strat-
egy.5 In the process of examining implications of the President's Article
II responsibilities, Professor Miller asks, "is international law a part of
the corpus of laws that the President must faithfully execute?"' The
answer is, most assuredly, yes.7
International law is part of the law of the United States. It binds
the United States through its constitutional incorporation into domestic
law, and also in its own right, as a self-contained legal system function-
ing independently of municipal law mechanisms of implementation and
enforcement. Substantively, international law binding upon the United
States already prohibits the aggressive threat or use of nuclear weap-
ons 8 and by treaty makes illegal a significant number of other uses of
nuclear weapons.9 Additionally there are other evolving international
law limitations and prohibitions relevant to nuclear weapons, 10 and, as
they crystallize, they will similarly constrain United States nuclear op-
tions. International law thus affects the legality of United States nu-
duced at Brooklyn Law School, Georgetown University Law School, McGill University
Law School, Nova University Law Center, Harvard Law School, and the Association
of the Bar of the City of New York. Additionally, at least 37 law schools held events
coinciding with November 11, 1982 Veterans' Day anti-nuclear activities cosponsored
by the Union of Concerned Scientists, Physicians for Social Responsibility, and the
Lawyers' Alliance for Nuclear Arms Control.
5. See Miller, Nuclear Weapons and Constitutional Law, 7 NOVA L.J. 21
(1982).
6. Id. at 33.
7. Paust, The Seizure and Recovery of the Mayaguez, 85 YALE L.J. 774, 803
n.131 (1976) ("the President is required to execute treaty and customary obligations
faithfully bbth at home and abroad"). See Paust, Is the President Bound by the Su-
preme Law of the Land?-Foreign Affairs and National Security Reexamined, 9 HAS-
TINGS CONST. L.Q. - (forthcoming 1982). Contra, L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND THE CONSTITUTION 221-22 (1972) ("the Constitution does not forbid the Presi-
dent (or the Congress) to violate international law"). For a well-reasoned critique of
Henkin's thesis, however, see Paust, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q., supra, at __ . For an
examination of domestic law implications for the United Kingdom of the international
illegality of nuclear weapons see Background Paper, Nuclear Weapons and the Law, 5
ST. RESEARCH BULL. (No. 31) 170 (1982).
8. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 43-80 and accompanying text.
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clear strategy directly and as another dimension of the constitutional
restraints outlined by Professor Miller.
I. International Law as Law of the Land: An Historical
Overview
International law was part of eighteenth century English common
law received into American law."1 State courts applied it prior to adop-
tion of the Constitution,12 and it was thoroughly familiar to partici-
11. One finds support for this proposition in the writings of that era's foremost
legal scholars, Blackstone and Lord Mansfield among them, "[W]here the individuals
of any state violate [the Law of Nations], it is then the interest as well as the duty of
the government under which they live, to animadvert upon them with a becoming se-
verity, that the peace of the world may be maintained." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMEN-
TARIES 68 (Ist ed. 1765-69) (emphasis added). For other examples of Blackstone's
writing on this subject, see 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 75, 263-64 (1st ed.
1765-69); 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 69, 108 (1st ed. 1765-69); 4 W. BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES 67-73 (1st ed. 1765-69).
Lord Mansfield wrote extensively and authoritatively on this subject. See, e.g.,.
Luke v. Lyde, 97 Eng. Rep. 614, 617, 2 Burr. 882, 887 (K.B. 1759); Lindo v. Rodney,
in LeCaux v. Eden, 99 Eng. Rep. 375, 385, 2 Doug. 594, 613 (1782).
See also the writing of Chief Justice Holt in Mogadara v. Holt, 89 Eng. Rep. 597-
98, 1 Show. K.B. 317-19 (K.B. 1691); and the writing of Lord Stowell in The Maria,
165 Eng. Rep. 199, 1 C. Rob 340, 350 (Adm. 1799); and The Recovery, 165 Eng. Rep.
955, 958, 6 C. Rob. 341, 348 (Adm. 1807) ("this is a Court of the Law of Nations,
though sitting here under the authority of the King of Great Britain.").
The Act of Anne of 1708 recognized that arrest of an ambassador pursuant to the
suit of creditors was "contrary of the Law of Nations" and proceeded to avoid all such
suits. Blackstone wrote that the Act was "not to be considered as introductive of any
new rule, but merely as declaratory of the old fundamental constitutions of the king-
dom; without which it must cease to be a part of the civilized world." 4 W. BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES 67 (1st ed. 1765-69). Lord Chancellor Talbot, in Barbuits Case
in Chancery, 25 Eng. Rep. 777, 777 (Ch. 1735), wrote that the Act was "only declara-
tory of the antient universal jus gentium," and Lord Mansfield agreed, observing that
the Act of Anne did not vary from international law because "[tlhis privilege of foreign
ministers . . . depends upon the law of nations," Triquet v. Bath, 97 Eng. Rep. 936,
937, 3 Burr. 1478, 1480 (K.B. 1764).
See generally Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the
United States, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 26, especially at 33 (1952) ("the Law of Nations
was part of the law of England").
12. E.g., Respublica v. DeLongschamps, I U.S. (1 Dall.) 111 (Pa. Oy. & Term.
1784). "The Law of nations. . .. in its fullest extent, is a part of the law of this state."
105 1
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pants in the Constitutional Convention.'" The Framers not only knew
common law writings upon the subject, but were also well schooled, as
was normal for educated men of their times, in the treatises of such
great international law scholars as Grotius, Pufendorf, and Vattel.' 4
What little controversy concerning international law existed dur-
ing the Constitutional Convention came from the inevitable intertwin-
ing of its incorporation with the difficulties of dividing powers between
national and state authorities, and between the various branches of the
proposed national government.15 The Constitution finally assigned ex-
clusive responsibility for international relations to the federal govern-
ment, divided it among the three branches, and specified that, in addi-
tion to the Constitution itself and federal statutes, "all Treaties made,
or which shall be made, . . . shall be the supreme law of the land.' 6
Id. at 116.
13. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 3, at 15 (J. Jay) (Bourne ed. 1947). THE
FEDERALIST No. 80, at 112, 114 (A. Hamilton) (Bourne ed. 1947); No. 83, at 144 (A.
Hamilton) (Bourne ed. 1947); No. 82 (A. Hamilton) (Bourne ed. 1947). See also
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 451 n.12 (1964) (White, J.,
dissenting); W. SOLBERG, THE FEDERAL CONVENTION AND THE FORMATION OF THE
UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES (1979). The participants in the Convention
had a knowledge of contemporary legal thought .... It was axiomatic
among them that the Law of Nations, applicable to individuals and to
states was an integral part of the law which they administered or prac-
ticed .... Whenever in terms or by implication they spoke or wrote with
reference to Law of Nations, they were indulging no mere flight of hopeful
rhetoric....
Dickenson, supra note 11, at 35-36.
14. Dickenson, supra note 11, at 35. See also E. DUMBAULD, THOMAS JEFFERSON
AND THE LAW 33 (1978); W. SOLBERG, supra note 13, at xxx.
15. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 3, at 15 (J. Jay) (J. Cooke ed. 1977); THE
FEDERALIST, No. 80, at 536 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1977). See M. FARRAND,
THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 91-123 (1918). See also
Dickenson, supra note 11, at 26-56.
16. U.S. CONST. art VI., cI. 2. Additionally, the Constitution provides that the
President
shall have the Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur;...
shall nominate, and by and with the Advise and Consent of the Senate,
shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls .... [art.
II, § 2, cl. 2;] shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers ....
[art. II, § 3; and] shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of
Nova Law Journal 7:19821
4
Nova Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 8
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol7/iss1/8
17:1982 International Law as Law of the Land 107
Chief Justice John Marshall little doubted that all international
law, no matter what its source, had been incorporated into the law of
the United States."7 American judicial decisions of the last 190 years
generally confirm Marshall's understanding of the place of the law of
nations in American law.18 The simplicity and clarity of early court
the United States and of the Militia of the Several States .... [art. II, §
2, cl. 1].
[Congress has the power to] provide for the common Defense ...
[art. I, § 8, cl. 1;] regulate Commerce with foreign Nations .... [art. I, §
8, cl. 3;] define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high
Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations .... [art. I, § 8, cl. 10;]
declare War, grant letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules con-
cerning Captures on Land and Water .... [art. I, § 8, cl. 11;] raise and
support Armies .... [art. I, § 8, cl. 12;] provide and maintain a
navy. .... [art. I, § 8, cl. 13; and] make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces [art. I, § 8, cl. 14].
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, aris-
ing under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;-to all cases affect-
ing Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;--to all Cases of ad-
miralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to controversies to which the United
States shall be a Party;-. . . to Controversies. . . between a State and
the Citizens of another State;-. . . and foreign States, Citizens or Sub-
jects. . . . [art. III, § 2, cl. 1]. In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a Party,
the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. [art. III, § 2, cl. 2].
17. "Marshall accepted the binding force of international law upon courts of the
United States with no apparent difficulty. . . " B. ZEGLER, THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF JOHN MARSHALL 5 (1939). See, e.g., the following decisions by Marshall: The
Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 120 (1825) ("[T]he law of nations. . . which has
received the assent of all must be the law of all. . . ."); The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9
Cranch) 388, 423 (1815) ("Until such an act be passed, the court is bound by the law
of nations, which is a part of the law of the land. . . ."); Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4
Cranch) 241, 277 (1808) ("[T]he law of nations is the law of all tribunals . . .");
Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) ("[A]n
act of congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other
possible construction remains. .. ").
18. See, e.g., Lauritzen v. Larrsen, 345 U.S. 571, 578 (1953); Skiriotes v. Flor-
ida, 313 U.S. 69, 72 (1941); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97 (1907); The Paquette
Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895); Tag v.
Rogers, 267 F.2d 664, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1959); The Lusitania, 251 F. 715, 732
(S.D.N.Y. 1915); The Appam, 234 F. 389, 400 (E.D. Va. 1916); Fernandez v. Wilkin-
son, 505 F. Supp. 787, 795 (D. Kan. 1980); United States v. Enger, 472 F. Supp. 490,
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decisions, however, has been lost as the question of the domestic role of
the law of nations became increasingly complicated by other legal is-
sues, including the allocation of competence between national and state
governments, 19 the political question doctrine,2" the self-execution doc-
trine,21 and the division of foreign affairs powers among the President
and the houses of Congress.22
The general principle that international law is part of United
States law, however, has survived even the chauvinism of manifest
destiny, the banality of American legal positivism, and the arrogance of
power that came with American twentieth century global hegemony.
Unfortunately, most of the present generation of American lawyers and
legal scholars fail to understand the role of international law within
504 (D.N.J. 1978); Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras v. McCulloch, 201
F. Supp. 82, 80 (D.D.C. 1962). See also Paust, Litigating Human Rights in U.S.
Courts, 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. 137 (1981).
19. See, e.g., Holmes v. Jenninson, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840) (where despite
the absence of an effective federal extradition treaty the governor of Vermont allowed a
Canadian resident to be extradited to Canada from Vermont; the Court refused to hear
the case because the Justices were equally divided on the meaning of the "Agreement
Clause," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). See
generally, L. HENKIN, supra note 7, at 227-49.
20. See generally, L. HENKIN, supra note 7, at 208-16; Gordon, American
Courts, International Law and "Political Questions" Which Touch Foreign Relations,
14 INT'L L. 297 (1980); Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE
L.J. 597 (1976); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959). See, e.g., Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 O.S. 297, 302
(1918) ("[C]onduct of the foreign relations of our Government is committed by the
Constitution to the Executive and Legislative--'the political'-Departments of the
Government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political
power is not sjubject to judicial inquiry or decision.").
21. See, e.g., Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829); Sei Fujii v.
State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952). See generally L. HENKIN, supra note 7, at
156-66. For a discussion of self-execution in the context of human rights treaties, see
Feinrider, Extraterritorial Abductions: A Newly. Developing International Standard,
14 AKRON L. REV. 27, 4:5 n.121 (1980).
22. "[T]he constitution is especially inarticulate in allocating foreign affairs pow-
ers; . . . a particular power can with equal logic and fair constitutional reading be
claimed for the president or for Congress. . . ." L. HENKIN, supra note 7, at 90. See
generally T. FRANCK & E. WEISBAND, FOREIGN POLICY BY CONGRESS 135-62 (1979);
Feinrider, America's Oil Pledges to Israel: Illegal But Binding Executive Agreements,
13 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 525, 537-49 (1981).
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American law; unlike their predecessors and members of the legal pro-
fession of other nations, they rarely study it.2" The significance of inter-
national law is lost upon this generation for whom American interna-
tional political, economic and military power is a ready substitute.
Nevertheless, as the world grows smaller and American dominance
grows weaker, the relevance of international law may be learned anew.
II. The International Dimension
International law is a law of consent and consensus. The existence
of consent given by sovereign nations is demonstrated by treaty, custom
and general principle-the primary sources of international law.24 In
the era of the United Nations Charter, when multilateral treaties are
common,2  international debate regular, and global communication
rapid, the process of achieving agreement creating international law is
23. "[I]t is really only in the past two decades that doubt has .been cast'on the
propriety of judicial invocation of international legal norms." Gordon, supra note 20, at
309.
24. The STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, generally recog-
nized as the most authoritative contemporary statement of the sources of international
law, directs that the world court shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establish-
ing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, at art. 38(1). Article 59 of
the STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE provides that "[t]he decision
of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that
particular case."
A recent International Court of Justice case (Nuclear Tests Case-Australia v.
France, 1974) and recent state practice (see infra note 41), suggest that even unilateral
statements by national representatives may be sources of international obligations.
25. During the first half of the 1960's 6,886 treaties entered into force. P. ROHN,
TREATY-PROFILES 57 (1976). One hundred forty-eight of them were multilateral. Gam-
ble, Reservations to Multilateral Treaties: A Macroscopic View of State Practice, 74
AM.- J. INT'L L. 372 (1980).
109 1International Law as Law of the Land17:1982
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potentially quicker than in times past.26 Further, the substance of inter-
national law is far greater than in times gone by, reaching nearly all
areas of concern to the law.17 At a time when the globe continues to
shrink daily, respect for and adherence to international law is the indis-
putable prerequisite for international peace and security.
International law is explored and relied upon not only in interna-
tional tribunals and fora, but also in the courts and legislative cham-
bers of the many nations of the world. This is a function of the fact
that at its present state of development international law still, for the
most part, relies upon municipal authorities for its enforcement. This,
however, does not mean that municipal determinations of the content
of international law define international obligations. To the contrary,
international law is ultimately determined according to its own
sources.28 If it were otherwise, a law of nations would be an impossibil-
ity, drowned in the parochial and often self-serving views of the world's
nations.
If a rule of international law exists, it is binding upon the United
States. International law, of course, protects against easy imposition of
obligations upon a nation without its assent. Once that assent is given,
however, or once a peremptory norm is created, binding international
obligations exist.2 9
26. See Cheng, United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: "Instant" Interna-
tional Customary Law, 5 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 23 (1965).
27. International agreements now deal with subjects as diverse as human rights,
exploration of the moon, uses of outer space, patents, trade and tariffs, settlement of
boundary disputes, arms limitation, protection of non-combatants and civilians during
time of international and non-international armed conflict, preservation of the environ-
ment, exploration of Antartica, assignment of radio broadcast frequencies, etc.
28. This is not to prejudge whether any particular norm has risen to the level of
a rule of international law, nor to minimize the role of the United States as an impor-
tant actor upon the global scene whose conduct is watched carefully for evidence of
relevant state practice by students of international law.
29. Treaties to which the United States is a party, according to the principle
pacta sunt servanda, are binding. Though subsequent inconsistent United States legis-
lation may negate the incorporation of treaties or customary rules of international law
into national law under the last in time doctrine, domestic law may likewise be negated
by subsequent inconsistent treaties or customs. RESTATEMENT SECOND OF FOREIGN RE-
LATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 135(1) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1980) (and Re-
porter's notes 1 & 6); see Murphy, Customary International Law in U.S. Jurispru-
dence-A Comment on Draft Restatement II, INT'L PRACTITIONER'S NOTEBOOK (No.
1 110 Nova Law Journal
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The Judgment at Nuremberg demonstrated the extent to which
the international community ascribes individual liability to government
officials for breaches of serious international obligations. As a party to
the charter which created the Nuremberg Tribunal, the United States
commited itself to the international rule of law, a commitment reaf-
firmed by its ratification of the United Nations charter. Certainly the
rule of international law is as binding upon the United States and its
government officials as it was binding upon Nazi Germany and the
German leaders brought to trial by the Allied Powers.
III. The Limits on and Potential of Law
Before proceeding to an analysis of international legal norms con-
cerning nuclear weaponry, we should first consider of what utility inter-
national law can be in the face of nuclear weapons; that is, how might
international law affect future use or plans for future use of nuclear
weapons? Though demonstration of the illegality of nuclear weapons
will not in itself determine the nuclear weapons question or prevent
policy planners from detailing conditions of future nuclear weapons
use, doctrinal inquiry is far from mere self-delusion.
International law, it is true, has generally not had enforcement
mechanisms other than the domestic machinery provided by nation-
states, its traditional subjects. Future international criminal law pun-
ishment of nuclear weapons users, however, could occur, based on the
Nuremberg precedent, but even this would not ensure the efficacy of
international legal norms. No law, no matter what its mechanism for
enforcement, can prevent illegal behavior other than by threat of nega-
tive after-the-fact consequences. The need for post facto punishment
reflects the inherent inadequacy of all law as an absolute deterrent to
proscribed behavior. This would be as true of the international law ba-
sis of a Nuremberg-type trial of those responsible for nuclear aggres-
sion as it is of the state penal code under which a murderer is brought
before some local trial court. Moreover, the nuclear apocalypse, should
it ever come to pass, might well preempt forever all possibility of after-
20) 17 (Oct. 1982). No matter what the domestic effect of subsequent legislation, how-
ever, the international obligations of the United States emanating from treaty or cus-
tom remain in force.
9
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the-fact legal consequences, making resort to law futile.
All law, however, receives whatever power it has, not primarily
from its threatened enforcement, but from the normative consensus un-
derlying it. In a democracy, according to theory, policy-makers and
members of the polity alike share in this consensus;"0 in an authorita-
rian or totalitarian society the leadership can only retain power by not
straying too far from the views of those below. Consensus and law,
through an interactive process, help create and strengthen each other,
thus effectively shaping behavior. Despite the elitist assumptions nor-
mally associated with governance and the present nation-state system,
consensus and law-even on the international level-can be built from
the bottom up. In fact, given the failure of the world's leaders to re-
spond effectively to the challenge of nuclear weapons, we may have no
choice but to rely on the efforts and consciousness of the people of the
United States, the Soviet Union, and all other nations.31 International
law, and its attempted implementation through domestic legal systems
which incorporate it, can effectively assist the popular movement
against nuclear weapons.
International law can help limit or even prevent future use of nu-
clear weapons by defining considerations of policy-makers, swaying
public dialogue, providing ammunition for anti-nuclear populist move-
ments, and demonstrating to all willing to listen the complete incom-
patability of nuclear weaponry with virtually the entire thrust of the
post-World War II effort to create structures and norms supportive of
international peace and security. Should these ends be accomplished,
they could well become means to the creation of law, and no small feat
will have been done. Enforcement of international proscriptions of nu-
clear weaponry may then prove unnecessary in view of a popular anti-
nuclear consensus globally reached.
30. See generally Paust, The Concept of Norm: Toward a Better Understanding
of Content, Authority, and Constitutional Choice, 53 TEMPLE L. Q. 226 (1980). For an
interesting view of the implications of nuclear weapons for democracy, see Falk, Nu-
clear Weapons and the End of Democracy, 2 PRAXIS INT'L 1 (1982).
31. But cf. Hoffman, International Law and the Control of Force, in THE RELE-
VANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF LEO GRoss 21 (K. Deutsch &
S. Hoffman eds. 1968).
1112 Nova Law Journal 7:19821
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IV. International Law and Nuclear Weapons
Analysis of the international legality of nuclear weapons must take
into account the complexities of reality. Nothing in fact or law justifies
the a priori lumping together, into one neat conceptual category, of all
types of nuclear weapons and all their possible uses. Defensive surgical
use of a low-yield clean tactical weapon against a clearly military tar-
get in an isolated geographical region with low population density, for
example, must be viewed, initially at least, as different from strategic
first-use of a multi-megaton dirty bomb against a major urban popula-
tion center. 2 A complex analytic task must be undertaken before we
can conclude that all uses and types of nuclear weapons are subject to
the same proscriptive norm of international law. Here, the goal is sim-
ply to make a small contribution toward accomplishment of that task.
-At present no treaty explicitly prohibits all use of nuclear weapons.
It is also probably correct to say that, as yet, no rule of customary
international law prohibits all use of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, a
variety of treaties, evidencing global disapprobation, explicitly outlaw
or limit a significant number of nuclear weapon uses. 33
By treaty, international law prohibits nuclear weapons deployment
or use in Antarctica, 34 Latin America, 35 earth orbit, outer space and on
32. See G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORDER 185-218
(1971). At a recent conference on nuclear weapons held at Brooklyn Law School on
September 25, 1982, Professor John Norton Moore, a noted conservative scholar of
international law, was forced to admit that the legality of nuclear weapons per se re-
mains an open question. Nevertheless, he challenged seriously the analysis of those
arguing for illegality by raising hypothetically the odd de minimus case. See Moore,
Remarks, 9 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.-(forthcoming 1983). Though his hypothetical did
not effectively undermine the basic argument for illegality of strategic use of nuclear
weapons, it raised questions concerning less dramatic nuclear uses that must be ad-
dressed by any purportedly comprehensive analysis. Intellectual honesty and rigor re
quire no less.
For an early attempt at doctrinal analysis of nuclear legality in light of the variety
of nuclear weapons and their possible uses, see G. SCHWARZENBERGER, THE LEGALITY
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (1958).
33. See R. SIVARD, WORLD MILITARY and'SoCIAL EXPENDITURES 13 (1981),
quoted in BRIEFING MANUAL,OF THE UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, SOLUTIONS
TO THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE 59-68 (1982>.
34. Antarctic Treaty, signed Dec. 1, 1959, enteked into force June 23,1961, 12
U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71 (ratified, as of Nov. 15, 1982, by 26
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celestial bodies,3 6 and deployment on the seabed beyond the twelve-
mile limit of national territorial seas.3 7 Further, more than one hundred
nations have subjected themselves to a rule of international law prohib-
iting possessors of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons technology
from transferring such weapons or technology to non-nuclear weapons
nations.38 Further yet, states may not even test nuclear weapons in
outer space, under water or within the earth's atmosphere." In addi-
tion, the United States and the Soviet Union have concluded a series of
bilateral agreements designed specifically to reduce the risk of acciden-
tal or avoidable military use of nuclear weapons during any confronta-
tion between the two superpowers,40 and also to limit the number of
states).
35. Treaty of Tlatelolco (Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty), Feb. 14,
1967, 634 U.N.T.S. 281 (ratified, as of Nov. 15, 1982, by 24 states; Argentina and
Cuba are the only Latin American states not party to this treaty, and Argentina has
signed but not yet ratified it).
36. Outer Space Treaty, signed Jan. 27, 1967, entered into force Oct. 10, 1967,
18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (ratified, as of Nov. 15, 1982,
by 81 states).
37. Seabed Treaty, signed Feb. 11, 1971, entered into force June 18, 1972, 23
U.S.T. 701, T.I.A.S. No. 7337 (ratified, as of Nov. 15, 1982, by 70 states).
38. Non-Proliferation Treaty, signed July 1, 1968, entered into force March 5,
1970, 21 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 (ratified, as of Nov. 15,
1982, by 119 states: bans transfer of nuclear weapons technology to non-nuclear weap-
ons states, and requires controls on "peaceful nuclear facilities" to prevent their being
turned to weapons production).
39. Partial Test Ban Treaty, signed Aug. 5, 1963, entered into force Oct. 10,
1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433 (ratified, as of Nov. 15, 1982, by 110 states).
The United States and the Soviet Union have concluded agreements limiting un-
derground testing of nuclear weapons but have not yet ratified them. See, Underground
Nuclear Weapon Test Treaty, signed July 3, 1974, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PRESS RE-
LEASE No. 281 (July 3, 1974), reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 906 (1974),
and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, signed May 28, 1976, U.S. ARMS CONTROL
& DISARMAMENT AGENCY, PUB. No. 87 (May 1976), reprinted in 15 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 891 (1976). Neither treaty has yet been ratified.
40. See Hot Line Agreement, signed and entered into force June 20, 1963, 14
U.S.T. 825; T.I.A.S. No. 5362, 472 U.N.T.S. 163; Hot Line Modernization Agree-
ment, signed and entered into force Sept. 30, 1971, 22 U.S.T. 1598, T.I.A.S. No. 7187,
806 U.N.T.S. 402; Accidents Measures Agreement, signed and entered into force Sept.
30, 1971, 22 U.S.T. 1590, T.I.A.S. No. 7186, 807 U.N.T.S. 57; Prevention of Nuclear
War Agreement, signed and entered into force June 22, 1973, 24 U.S.T. 1478, T.I.A.S.
No. 7654 (agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union).
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nuclear weapons allowed to each.4
In view of these substantial restrictions on nuclear weaponry ex-
plicitly imposed by conventional international law, what remains to be
explored are ways in Which uses of nuclear weapons still unaddressed
by treaty may be subject to implicit legal constraints emanating from
the structures and norms of international law generally. In the present
context, the result of such examination leads to the conclusion that a
rule of customary international law outlawing nuclear weapons per se is
currently in the process of being created.42
A. The Lawyer's Committee Analysis
In the most well-developed analysis currently available,43 members
of the Consultative Council of the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear
Policy rely heavily on the laws of war,44 Nuremburg principles,45 Gen-
41. Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, signed May 26, 1972, entered into force Oct.
23, 1973, 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503, and Protocol of 1974, signed July 3,
1974, entered into force May 24, 1976, 27 U.S.T. 1645, T.I.A.S. No. 8276; Interim
Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive
Arms (SALT I), signed May 26, 1972, entered into force Oct. 3, 1972, 23 U.S.T.
3462, T.I.A.S. No. 7504, expired Oct. 2, 1977 (after expiration, the terms of this
treaty were continued in force for the United States and the Soviet Union by means of
Parallel Unilateral Policy Declarations); SALT II, signed June 18, 1979, not yet rati-
fied, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. 8984, SALT II AGREEMENT, VIENNA (Selected Docu-
ments No. 12A, June 18, 1979), reprinted in 18 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1138 (1979)
(agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union).
42. Law, as Professor Thomas Franck has pointed out, is "congealed politics." T.
FRANCK AND M. MUNANSANGO, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW IN THE MAKING? 1 (UNITAR Policy and Efficacy Study No. 6,
1982). Unfortunately, the world social order has only begun the "congealing" neces-
sary to overcome the cultural lag between norm and technology that has thus far re-
tarded development of rules regulating the most awesome of humankind's technological
'achievements.' Examination of politics in the process of congealing, then, becomes in-
cumbent upon those seeking to understand the ways in which international law does
and can address the issues raised by nuclear weaponry.
43. See R. FALK, L. MEYROWITZ, & J. SANDERSON, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Occasional Paper No. 10, World Order Studies Program,
Center of International Studies, Princeton University (1981)). See also Meyrowitz,
Nuclear Weapons Policy: The New Tyranny, 7 NOVA L.J. 93 (1982).
44. E.g., the St. Petersburg Declaration, (1868); the 1889 Hague Declaration
Respecting Asphyxiating Gases; the Hague Conventions of 1907, arts. 22, 23(a) and
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eral Assembly recommendations (resolutions),46 and a policy analysis
of international law. They convincingly argue international law now
limiting war-making by nations equally applies to nuclear war-making,
and "any threat or contemplated use of nuclear weapons is contrary to
the dictates of international law, and constitutes a crime of state...
[the continuation of which] should be enjoined by judicial bodies and
opposed by citizens and nongovernmental organizations. ' 47 Elliot L.
Meyrowitz, Vice-Chairperson of the Lawyers' Committee sets forth
this analysis in greater detail elsewhere in this issue of Nova Law Jour-
nal,48 thus obviating the need for lengthy discussion here.
On the basis of the Lawyers' Committee analysis we can conclude
that international law prohibits, at a minimum, those uses and kinds of
nuclear weapons violative of the binding principle of proportionality ap-
plicable to all warfare and weapons.49 This general principle of human-
itarian law requires that "[b]elligerents shall not inflict harm on their
adversaries out of proportion with the object of warfare, which is to
destroy or weaken the military strength of the enemy."'50 Proportional-
23(e) of the regulations annexed thereto and the famous "de Martens" preambular
clause; the Treaty of Versailles (1919), art. 171; the Geneva Gas Protocol of 1925; the
four Geneva Conventions of 1949; and, the 1977 Protocol on Humanitarian law Appli-
cable to Armed Conflict, Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. See R. FALK,
L. MEYROWITZ & J. SANDERSON, supra note 43, at 21-33.
45. See R. FALK, L. MEYROWITZ & J. SANDERSON, supra note 43, at 63-71.
46. G.A. Res. 1380, 14 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 4, U.N. Doc. A/4354
(1959); G.A. Res. 1643, 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 34, U.N. Doc. A/5100
(1961); G.A. Res. 2162, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 10, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966); G.A. Res. 2936, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 5, U.N. Doc. A/8730
(1972); G.A. Res. 2849, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 29) at 70, U.N. Doc. A/8429
(1971); G.A. Res. 3246, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 87, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974); G.A. Res. 3154, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 34, U.N. Doc. A/9030
(1973); G.A. Res. 35/152, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 48) at 69, U.N. Doc A/3548
(1980). See R. FALK, L. MEYROWITZ & J. SANDERSON, supra note 43, at 58-62.
47. R. FALK, L. MEYROWITZ & J. SANDERSON, supra note 43, at 78.
48. See Meyrowitz, supra note 43.
49. See R. FALK, L. MEYROWITZ & J. SANDERSON, supra note 43, at 23-26;
Meyrowitz, supra note 43, at 93.
50. J. PICTET, THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 30 (un-
dated; available from the International Committee of the Red Cross). See International
Committee of the Red Cross, Some International Red Cross Conference Resolutions
and ICRC Statements on the Protection of Civilian Population and on Weapons of
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ity, and its correlate providing that "[b]elligerents do not have unlim-
ited choice in the means of inflicting damage on the enemy," 51 have
spawned three binding principles of humanitarian law proper to the
rules of war:
[(1)] [b]elligerents will leave non-combatants outside the area of
operations and will refrain from attacking them deliberately[;]...
[(2)]. [a]ttacks are only legitimate when directed against military
objectives, that is to say whose total or partial destruction would
constitue a definite military advantage. . . [; and]
[(3)] [w]eapons and methods of warfare likely to cause excessive
suffering are prohibited.52
Nuclear weapons, many of which have massive destructive capabilities,
long-lasting environmental and genetic effects, and a unique capacity
for indiscriminate devastation, are more likely than other weapons to
violate proportionality and the three principles derived therefrom. To
the extent that certain uses of nuclear weapons would violate these
principles, international law, as it exists today, prohibits them.
B. Charter Restraints on Nuclear Weapons
Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations, the preeminent
international legal document of our time, makes clear that the raison
dkre of the United Nations is, first and foremost, "to maintain interna-
tional peace and security. '5 3 The preamble of the Charter reminds us
Mass Destruction (August, 1981).
51. J. PICTET, supra note 50, at 32.
'52. Id. at 52-55.
53. U.N. CHARTER art. 1. Article 1, in relevant part, provides;
The Purposes of the United Nations are:
(1) To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to
take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats
to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other
breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in con-
formity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or
settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a
breach of the peace;
(2) To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take
117 1
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that the Organization was brought into being "to save succeeding gen-
erations from the scourge of war,"'54 and no scourge could be greater
than the one threatened by military use of nuclear weapons.
The article 2(4) prohibition of aggressive war55 forbids use of nu-
clear weapons as part of an aggressive war just as it forbids aggressive
use of other weapons. Article 51, however, goes further and prohibits
even certain defensive uses of nuclear weapons because of their unique
.capacity for mass destruction. The Charter recognizes the inherent sov-
.ereign right of self-defense against armed attack, yet it further provides
that the right of self-defense will remain unimpaired by Charter obliga-
tions only "until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security."5 Article 51 also requires
other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace ....
54. U.N. CHARTER preamble. The preamble reads as follows:
WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED
to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice
in our life-time has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and
to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and
worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of
nations large and small, and
to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obliga-
tions arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be
maintained, and
to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger
freedom,
AND FOR THESE ENDS
to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as
good neighbours, and
to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and
to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of meth-
ods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and
to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic
and social advancement of all peoples,
HAVE RESOLVED To COMBINE OUR EFFORTS To ACCOMPLISH THESE
AIMS.
55. U.N. CHARTER article 2, paragraph 4 reads as follows:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes
of the United Nations.
56. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
1 118 Nova Law Journal
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that self-defense measures taken before the Security Council becomes
seized of a conflict "shall not in any way affect the authority and re-
sponsibility of the Security Council. . . to take at any time such action
as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international
peace and security. '57 This apparently further limits the number of sit-
uations in which nuclear weapons could lawfully be used. For example,
a nuclear attack on New York City resulting in destruction of United
Nations headquarters would, to say the least, affect negatively the au-
thority and responsibility of the Security Council in violation of article
51. Similarly, nuclear incineration of Moscow or Washington, D.C., or
the capital of any permanent or non-permanent member of the Security
Council also would violate the letter and spirit of article 51.58
The article 51 limited right to self-defense, and the rest of the
United Nations Charter, thus tell us that though the authors of the
Charter knew the article 2(4) prohibition of aggressive war would
likely be violated, they also envisioned a bottom-line limitation on war-
making in the name of self-defense: the peace-making and peace-re-
storing machinery of the United Nations must always remain available
to serve the needs of humankind. The Charter, in article 2(3), explicitly
imposes upon states the duty to respect this bottom line.5 9 Any irrepa-
rable interference with the functioning or existence of international
structures of peace would violate criminally the very object and pur-
Article 51, in full, provides that:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of indi-
vidual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Mem-
ber of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by
Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the au-
thority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Char-
ter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to main-
tain or restore international peace and security.
See also U.N. CHARTER article 2, paragraph 3 which requires that "all Members shall
settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that interna-
tional peace and security, and justice, are not endangered."
57. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
58. Is there anyone who would argue, should the analysis presented in the text be
correct, that nations "merely" members of the General Assembly would remain legally
unprotected against nuclear attack?
59. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 3, supra note 56.
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pose of the United Nations Charter; cynicism concerning the likelihood
of effective U.N. action would be no defense. No head of state could
violate this international law bottom-line without having need to fear a
Nuremberg-type trial.60 It is inconceivable that the United States Con-
stitution would allow the President to engage in nuclear crimes against
the international structures of peace. Consequently, both international
and United States domestic law prohibit at least strategic weapons as-
pects of United States "flexible response" strategy, which provides for
escalating first-use of nuclear weapons in the event of Soviet conven-
tional forces attacks in Europe.
C. The Human Rights/Natural Law Right to Survival
War is the ultimate, albeit irrational, act of sovereignty. It is
therefore appropriate to look to international law restraints on sover-
eignty for possible limits on the ultimate act of war-nuclear attack.
International human rights law may well serve as a fertile source for
such limits on state nuclear war-making powers; human rights law has
otherwise been responsible for the most significant limitations upon the
sovereignty of states within the world order of the United Nations era.
Since the unanimous adoption by the General Assembly of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948,1 numerous treaties of
a universal, regional or specialized character have established limita-
tions on the ways in which a national government can (mis)treat its
60. Of course, if nuclear war occurs there may well be no survivors to conduct
the trial.
61. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 271A, U.N. Doc. A/810,
at 71 (1948). The Universal Declaration was originally intended as an aspirational
statement establishing a "common standard of achievement" for humankind, id.; how-
ever, many now agree that the terms of the Declaration, or at least some of them have
become binding customary international law. See, e.g., R. LILLICH & F. NEWMAN,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY 7 (1979);
Humphrey, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Its History, Impact and Ju-
ridical Character, in HUMAN RIGHTS: THIRTY YEARS AFTER THE UNIVERSAL DECLA-
RATION 22 (B.G. Ramcharan ed. 1979). See also Montreal Statement of the Assembly
for Human Rights 2 (1968), reprinted in 9 J. INT'L COMM. JUR. 94, 95 (1968); Decla-
ration of Teheran, Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights 3, at 4,
para. 2, U.N. Dec. A.Conf. 32/41; G.A. Res. 2442, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at
49, U.N. Dec. A/7218 (1968).
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own citizenry. 2 Over the last thirty years these treaties have been the
subject of more than three hundred fifty separate acts of ratification,
changing dramatically the very conceptualization of international law
as a law only of nations.63 Now, individuals too can be subjects of, and
direct recipients of rights under international law. Inherent in this de-
velopment has been recognition that at the heart of all government and
law, whether on the international or municipal level, exists a core set of
values and rights protecting humankind which emanates from natural
law.6
4
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights both
speak of the "inherent dignity"65 of the human person and the "inalien-
able rights of all members of the human family."66 The Preamble to
62. E.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19,
1966, entered into force March 23, 1976, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (ratified, as of Nov. 15, 1982, by 72 states);
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec. 19,
1966, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
16) at 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (ratified, as of Nov. 15, 1982, by 75 states);
[European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, signed Nov. 4, 1950, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (ratified
by all 21 members of the Council of Europe); American Convention on Human Rights,
signed Nov. 22, 1969, entered into force July 18, 1978, 36 O.A.S. T.S. No. 1, O.A.S.
Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. L/V/II.23 doc. rev. 2 (ratified, as of Nov. 15, 1982, by 17 states);
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, entered into force Jan. 4, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S. 195
(ratified, as of Nov. 15, 1982, by 117 states). For one view of the relationship between
human rights and international law, see D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in
International Law, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1110 (1982).
63. The Vienna Convention on The Law of Treaties recognizes that some differ-
ence exists between international human rights treaties and other treaties. Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties, art. 60(5), opened for signature May 27, 1969, entered
into force Jan. 27, 1980, U.N. Conf. on Law of Treaties Off. Rec., 1st & 2d Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf./39/27 at 289. See Feinrider, supra note 21, at 43 n.116. The
Vienna Convention has been ratified, as of Nov. 15, 1982, by 43 states; the United
States has signed but not yet ratified it.
64. See infra notes 65-74 and accompanying text.
65. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 62, at pre-
amble (emphasis added); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, supra note 62, at preamble (emphasis added).
66. See supra note 65.
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the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination states that the United Nations Charter "is based on the
principles of the dignity and equality inherent in all human beings," 7
and, repeating the language of the Universal Declaration, concludes
"that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights." 68
The American Convention on Human Rights recognizes that "the es-
sential rights of man are not derived from one's being the national of a
certain state, but are based upon the attributes of the human personal-
ity."6 9 Language such as this indicates comprehension of a natural law
basis for human rights,70 and, when incorporated into treaties, evi-
dences both the state practice and opinio juris necessary for creating
The common preambular language of the two covenants, in relevant part, reads as
follows:
Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the
Charter of the United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of
the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.
Recognizing that these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the
human person,
Recognizing that, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the ideal of free human beings enjoying civil and political
freedom and freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if condi-
tions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his civil and political rights,
as well as his economic, social and cultural rights ...
67. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrim-
ination, supra note 62, at preamble (emphasis added).
68. Id. (emphasis added).
69. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 62, at preamble (em-
phasis added).
70. See R. FALK, HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY 42-45 (1981). See
also Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 796 (D. Kan. 1980) ("The develop-
ment of international agreements containing human rights norms which purport to be
binding ... was a significant step in the transformation of natural rights into positive
legal rights."), affd on other grounds, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981), discussed in
Note, Custom and General Principles as Sources of International law in American
Courts, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 751, 773-74 (1982).
The language quoted in the text at notes 65-70 is, admittedly, preambular lan-
guage. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on The Law of Treaties, supra note 63,
however, provides that a preamble is to be considered part of a treaty's text -and is
among the primary sources for treaty interpretation. Cf. Miller, supra note 5, at 27-29
(analysis regarding the substantive import of the preamble to the United States
Constitution).
Nova Law Journal
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customary international law.71
Surely, if individuals have inherent and inalienable natural rights
superior to the positive international law rights of sovereign states, then
so does humankind, if only as holder of the aggregate of rights belong-
ing to its individual members.72 The superiority of individual and col-
lective natural rights over positive state rights only makes sense if indi-
vidual and collective survival is assured. Individually and collectively,
then, we all have the right not to have our survival threatened by states
71. To establish that a norm has become customary international law it is neces-
sary to demonstrate the existence of a substantial number of states acting in conformity
with the norm and that those states were in conformity because of a belief on their part
that their behavior was required by law (opinio juris). Here, the norm is one providing
that individuals have natural rights limiting the sovereign rights of states. The volun-
tary subordination of sovereign rights to human rights through the ratification of trea-
ties, (see supra note 62) is state practice, and the preambular language of these treaties
is clear evidence of opinio juris, that is, that the states ratifying them were motivated
by the belief they were required to do so by certain preexisting "inherent," "inaliena-
ble" "essential" rights, "attributes of the human personality" belonging to beings "born
free and equal in dignity and rights." See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
The argument for illegality of nuclear weapons presented here should be distin-
guished from the one Eugene Rostow, Director of the United States Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, was presumably attempting to rebut at the Panel on Strategic
Deterrence and Nuclear War of the 1982 Annual Meeting of the American Society of
International Law. Rostow, in support of his argument that international law does not
prohibit nuclear weapons per se, cited The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825).
See Panel on Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear War (response of Eugene Rostow to
question of Professor Burns Weston) in the Proceedings of the 76th Annual Meeting of
the American Society of International Law (Apr. 22, 1982). In The Antelope, Chief
Justice John Marshall wrote that though slavery was repugnant to natural law, its pro-
hibition had not yet been incorporated into international law and therefore was not
enforceable in United States courts. Here, the argument is that natural law, by way of
custom, has recently been incorporated into international law and the natural law right
to collective survival is therefore part of United States law. Nothing in The Antelope
contradicts this assertion.
72. A similar argument to that presented in text, but more palatable to posi-
tivists, could be based on the universally recognized "right to life" and the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened for signature
Dec. 9, 1948, entered into force Jan. 12, 1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1951) (ratified, as of
Nov. 15, 1982, by 84 states). Nuclear holocaust would be seen as murder and genocide
multiplied, just as some have suggested that Nuremberg convictions for genocide were
not based on ex-post-facto law because murder had long been a crime in all "civilized"
nations.
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acting out their sovereignty through use of nuclear weapons of mass
destruction. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides
that "everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which
the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Declaration can be fully real-
ized. ' ' "7 Nuclear weapons threaten that order, and even as ardent a
positivist as H.L.A. Hart has recognized that at the core of law is the
assumption that "the proper end of human activity is survival." 7' 4
D. The Right to Peace
The "right to peace" is another legal expression of humankind's
collective natural right to survive. In 1979, Karel Vasak, the chief legal
officer of UNESCO, argued that civil and political rights, and social,
economic and cultural rights, are being joined and enhanced by a
"third generation of human rights" which includes the "right to
peace. 175 Though such "group rights" or "solidarity rights," or "global
rights" as Saul Mendlovitz has called them,7 6 remain controversial
within the international human rights community,7" they have, in fact,
73. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 61, at art. 28.
74. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 187 (1961).
75. See Vasak, Inagural Address: Pour Les Droits de l'Homme de la Troisieme
Generation: Les Droits de Solidarit6, in International Institute of Human Rights,
Summary of Lectures-Tenth Study Session (July 1979).
76. In Mendlovitz' view, the struggle for individual civil and political rights now
typical of western liberal (capitalist) democracies marked the 19th century; the strug-
gle for group social and economic rights typical of eastern communist societies marked
the 20th century; and the struggle for global, or planetary rights such as those we are
now beginning to see develop (e.g., the right to a clean environment and the right to
peace) will mark the 21st century. See Mendlovitz, Remarks, 9 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
_ (forthcoming 1983).
77. E.g., A. H. Robertson, one-time Acting Secretary General of the Interna-
tional Institute of Human Rights and noted specialist in international human' rights
law, consistently criticized "third generation rights" during sessions of the Institute's
Human Rights Teaching Center because, in his view, they are not susceptible to en-
forcement by law. Additionally, he wondered against whom such rights might be
enforceable.
For a thoughtful critique of the right to peace as a group or solidarity right, see
Bilder, The Right to Peace as a Human Right, Remarks made at the International
Symposium on the Morality and Legality of Nuclear Weapons, in New York City
(June 4-5, 1982). (Available in author's file at Nova University Center for the Study of
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generated substantial debate and academic inquiry in Europe.7 8 Only
very recently have they been taken up as the subject of study within
the United States.7 ' If such rights exist, or are in the process of being
created, whether reached inductively as the aggregate of all individual
civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights recognized by inter-
national law or deductively from the evolving world order of humanity
entering the twenty-first century, then the right to peace must be added
to the norms limiting nuclear options. Though "peace" may mean more
than mere absence of war, it certainly means at least absence of war
and assurance of survival. The "right to peace" may thus confirm the
integration of H.L.A. Hart's observation regarding the axiomatic rela-
tionship of law and survival" into the global legal system, meeting ef-
fectively, on a conceptual level at least, the threat of planetary eradica-
tion by nuclear holocaust.
Conclusion
As has been aptly put by Professor Saul Mendlovitz, "nuclear
weapons are disgusting."81 They are an abomination that must be out-
lawed by any civilized legal system worthy of the name.
International law already explicitly prohibits many, perhaps most
uses of nuclear weapons. The structures and norms of international law
and evolving conceptualizations of limits on state sovereignty strongly
suggest the illegality of the remaining uses. At the very least these re-
maining uses should be seen as no more than exceptions which ought
not be permitted to devour the emerging proscriptive rule. The interna-
tional illegality of so many uses of nuclear weapons shifts the burden of
persuasion to the proponents of nuclear weaponry. It is they who are on
Law).
78. See, e.g., Morehouse, The Right to Peace or the Right to Live, 6 HOLDS-
WORTH L. REV. 120 (1981); and the following articles contained in 1980 BULLETIN OF
PEACE PROPOSALS No. 4, SPECIAL ISSUE: THE RIGHT TO PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT:
Alston, Peace as a Human Right; Marks, The Peace-Human Rights-Development
Dialectic; Lopatka, The Right to Live in Peace as a Human Right.
79. See, e.g., Bilder, supra note 77; Nanda, Nuclear Weapons and the Right to
Peace Under International Law, 9 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.-(forthcoming 1983).
80. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
81. Mendlovitz, supra note 76.
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the defensive now, legally as well as morally, they carry the onus of
seeking legal sanction for the remaining nuclear weapons uses.
A comprehensive custom outlawing nuclear weapons per se is in
the process of being created. It is, hopefully, only a matter of time
before municipal as well as international legal systems specifically pro-
hibit all use of nuclear weapons. In the alternative, our present civiliza-
tion will vaporize in the blinding flash of nuclear explosions forever de-
stroying humankind, its legacy of achievements and its dreams for a
future of well-being and peace.
Professor Arthur S. Miller, in his seminal work, has given to
American lawyers the hope of promise and the burden of challenge. He
calls upon us to help our domestic legal system rise to the task of meet-
ing head-on the nuclear nightmare of our time, a bad dream come true
beyond the imagination of even the most pessimistic of eighteenth cen-
tury apocalypts. By probing our nearly two hundred year old constitu-
tion for checks and balances and values that could "secure the Bless-
ings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity"8 2 he sets a standard of
achievement we must all strive to meet.
In response to Professor Miller's challenge, international lawyers
must first turn a conservative, slow-moving discipline to face the nu-
clear challenge just as Miller has so artfully turned the U.S. Constitu-
tion. Second, they must help educate American domestic lawyers to the
fact that international law is part of the law of the land. Success in the
first will make the second all the more important: the United States
remains the most powerful nuclear arsenal on earth. Fortunately, law is
on the side of those who wish to hold the President to an international
rule of law. The Constitution, in this matter, is clear. If, as suggested
above, a norm of international law prohibits all, or at least most uses of
nuclear weaponry, to answer Professor Miller's question, that norm is
"part of the corpus of 'laws' that the President must faithfully
execute."83
82. U.S. CONST. preamble.
83. Miller, supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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